An Uphill Battle

   It can be difficult to explain the reasons why an inexperienced army such as the Continental Army could ultimately best the world’s best fighting force of the 18th century. One could labor in depth about the intricacies of insurgent and counter-insurgent and unconventional warfare (UW). It’s an academic discipline unto itself and many scholars have probed and exhausted the subject to only scratch the surface.

   Besides the traditional and broad factors that sustain insurgencies and allow them to achieve victory such as, the political and military will to fight, strategy and strategic interaction of insurgents and opponents, regime type (liberal democracy v. authoritarian), and external support in the form of money, weapons, personnel and safe areas (local support) as mentioned prior, its important to simplify it for this particular discussion.

   Did America have the political and military will to fight? Yes. What was the regime type America was fighting for? Liberal Democracy. Did the colonies have local support? Absolutely. Did the colonies have external support? Yes, but not until much later in the war (France). However, what was it that sustained, initially, a bruised and battered army that was in continual retreat in the first years of the war? To simplify the matter one can connote two simple theories. The leaders who led the Continental Army and the qualities they possessed and the abstract ideals that carried a people aloft and eventually to victory. The later was not indicative of wars fought formerly by the ancien re’gime. America fought a different war. I mention these because as a former retired Special Forces officer it was a subject which popped up often in the team houses. Most of us “team guys” were avid fans of history and of course the story of America’s founding and its struggle and victory was always the corner stone of any discussion of unconventional and insurgency type warfare.

  The leaders of the Revolutionary Army, most, possessed innate qualities required to conduct a defensive war [in the beginning]and carry it through to an offensive military force. Its obvious that the Continentals had little choice, in the early phases, to conduct any strategy but a defensive war. However, it takes commander(s) extreme patience and reserve to do so. America had this quality in such a commander. General George Washington. Washington was patient and determined. He believed resolutely in the cause he was fighting to achieve. Washington displayed this attribute in Boston and New York. It must be the worst feeling to take command of a fledgling force, witness retreat after retreat, deal with supply and manpower issues continually and seemingly have little support from a Congress with little resources at hand to help much in the matter. Also, Washington had to deal with political enemies from within that clamored to out maneuver him for command of the army and often called for his resignation. Most assuredly, commanders such as Gates and Lee were his biggest detractors.

   Washington’s patience as well as his cunning won the day eventually. In the face of his internal enemies Washington snatched victory from the jaws of defeat with victories at Trenton and Princeton. Opting for a bold and daring strategy to conduct a winter campaign at a time when armies of the 18th century hibernated for the season. This deflated the wind in the sails of his instigators such as Gates, Lee and even some in the Congress. General Charles Lee, who was infinitely more qualified to lead the Continental Army; he was a veteran of the Seven Years War, France, Poland and Portugal, lacked the quality of patience and humility of Washington. This can also be said of Gates. They both seeked glory while liberty took a backseat to their agenda, power and fame. Even after Washington bested his political enemies he seemingly forgave them and reenlisted them back into the cause of freedom. He had a remarkable quality to see and exploit the better qualities from his subordinate officers.

   General Benedict Arnold was dissuaded from resigning his commission after Washington once appealed to his “better angels” in the cause of liberty. Whereas, some officers were driven by fame and fortune, Washington seemed aloof to those particular trappings. He already was wealthy, one of the wealthiest planters in the colonies. As far as fame was concerned he seemed to have no desperate desire. Of course, he always fretted over his reputation. In the end it was his patience, cunning and candor that helped him achieve the ultimate goal of victory. Remarkable character traits most likely learned from experience, especially from his tenure of duty in the French and Indian Wars.

   It would be unfair to exclude the many subordinate officers, enlisted men and citizens from the successful factors. However, as with Washington and many other commanders the abstract ideals of freedom, liberty and independence can be greatly attributed to American victory. These abstract ideals buoyed the colonies to success. The feelings were so deep and strong that many of the men and women were willing to sacrifice everything they had for the cause.

   As the delegates had done so after the first Continental Congress: to pledge their lives, their fortunes and their sacred honor, so did the common folk. They were willing to risk all to support the cause of liberty in the form of support, money or manpower. Many had done just that. It's historically recounted about famous battle and a supposed colonel had ordered his artillery to fire upon a house used by the British as a Head Quarters. When informed that it was his very own house, he gave the order to proceed anyhow. Young Andrew Jackson, “Old Hickory” long before his noted fame at the battle of New Orleans in 1815, had enlisted into the Continental Army along with three of his brothers at the tender age of 14. They were captured by British forces at the battle of Hanging Rock and were incarcerated. Jackson watched three of his brothers consumed by Yellow Fever while in prison. Something which probably was ever present and forefront in his mind during the War of 1812. It was these abstract ideals which drove the colonies to ultimate victory.

   In final analysis it was patience on the part of commanders, Washington in particular, and the abstract values of freedom and liberty. Values which are hard to define and sometimes can lead to more violence and bloodshed than necessary as will be discussed later. It was these principles which out trumped the professional and more experience British.

   In the first year of conflict, the situation seemed dire and in imminent danger of failure. Many in the Continental Congress and the Army had their doubts and misgivings about American military proficiency and the seemingly impossible odds of victory over a well trained and highly experienced British army. Britain reined supreme in world affairs in the 18th century. Wars with France, Spain and even civil war amongst themselves and prior centuries of experience in “empire building” attributed to unparalleled English supremacy and world dominance. The Continentals, it can be agreed, hadn’t much going for them in terms of military credentials. Of course, Americans had seen battle. The French and Indian War had given many combat experience, as well as many skirmishes with native Americans throughout the long and arduous task of settlement. However, the ability of the Continental army to stave off defeat and live another day can be attributed to several factors. Besides the traditional and broad factors that sustain insurgencies and allow them to achieve victory such as, the political and military will to fight, strategy and strategic interaction of insurgents and opponents, regime type (liberal democracy v. authoritarian), and external support in the form of money, weapons, personnel and safe areas (local support). It’s important to keep it to more specific reasons especially concerning the first year of conflict. After all, it only seemed to be “half war” as John Adams would succinctly describe the initial year of fighting.

   Boston was the first major area of the conflict and one could say that it didn’t all go swimmingly well for the British let alone the Americans. Continental forces were able to survive the first year for several reasons. The first was that New England forces were primarily in a defensive mode. It was still not a war of movement or maneuver. This allowed patriot forces to dig in and take advantage of their terrain. Large scale assaults uphill are always precarious at best and is any commanders least preferred method. However, with the location of Boston harbor and Bunker and Breed’s Hills offered the advantage to the defender. British ships had to anchor and deploy or ferry troops to shore to assemble for the assault. Thus allowing patriot forces the comfort of time and observation for preparation of defense plans. 18th century warfare was very controlled and complex and any commander wouldn’t like to rush an assault of this nature. The ability of Prescott to predict the landing site of Howe’s forces enabled them to effectively use the terrain to their advantage. Patriot forces created obstacles to hinder the British advance and used cover effectively to rain down an incessant stream of led into the unfortunate marauders. Eventually, the defensive line broke and American forces retreated, however, it cost the British troops to include their commanders a heavy toll personally as well as psychologically.

   This leads to a second reason for patriot resilience. The British overestimated their abilities and confidence. This was evident when Howe failed to follow standard military doctrine in his haste to attack the redoubt. Instead his troops were left exposed and presented themselves as juicy targets of opportunity to their enemy. It was a lesson which many future commanders would heed and some would continue to ignore through the course of the conflict. Lastly, the ability of the American commanders was good. I say good and not excellent for a reason. New England officers were largely untested but had a certain magnitude of experience in war. Their courage and bravery made a difference to untrained and inexperienced soldiers. They also had the ability to think fast on their feet which can make all the difference between total disaster and mitigated damage. Also, it was this uncanny and unusual ability by Continental commanders such as George Washington to heed the council of war’s-civilian authority- recommendations and advice. This proved valuable when he listened to their order to not attack and instead defend Dorchester Heights. Eventually, the British pulled out of Boston, staving off future battles that would probably have been costly for the Americans. One could argue that these were not great attributes compared to the more compelling ones which an army needs to achieve victory. America displayed a bold aggressiveness in its decision to invade the northern territory (Canada), but despite the raw courage and tenacity of troops and leaders the effort failed. On the other hand, it was these lesser traits that slowed total defeat and helped to avoid total collapse of a fledgling nation’s cause.